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THE DRUG-FREE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: A QUESTION
OF REASONABLENESS
Drug surveillance testing in the workplace has become the focal
point of growing national concern over substance abuse and is the
subject of increasing litigation.' During the past five years, testing
programs have expanded from the armed forces, where they have
been in place for over a decade,2 to various national security, law
enforcement, and public safety agencies, as well as the private sector. s On September 15, 1986, President Reagan issued Executive
Order No. 12,564, requiring drug surveillance testing for federal
employees who occupied sensitive positions. 4 The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) immediately challenged the order,

1. See CIVIL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T
REPORT

OF JUSTICE, ISSUE

1-3 (Sept. 19, 1986) [hereinafter

No. 1, DRUG

PREVENTION LITIGATION

DRUG PREVENTION LITIGATION REPORT].

2. See, e.g., Williams v. Secretary of the Navy, 787 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Committee
for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
3. See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), afl'd, 814 F.2d 120
(2d Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), afl'd as modified,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App.
1985). By November 1986, over 35% of the Fortune 500 companies had established drug
surveillance programs, usually in conjunction with educational and rehabilitative assistance.
See Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1986, § 2, at 39, col. 4.
4. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889, 32,890 (1986). The order defined employees occupying sensitive positions as follows:
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special Sensitive, Critical Sensitive, or Non-Critical Sensitive under Chapter 731 of the
Federal Personnel Manual or an employee in a position that an agency head
designates as sensitive in accordance with Executive Order No. 10,450, as
amended;
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information or
may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a determination of
trustworthiness by an agency head under Section 4 of Executive Order No.
12,356;
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments;
(4) Law enforcement officers as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20); and
(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law enforcement, national security, the protection of life and property, public health or
safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of trust and confidence.
51 Fed. Reg. at 32,892-93. Nearly half the 2.7 million civilians employed by federal executive
agencies fall within the scope of this definition. See Drug Testing Stall Tactics, Washington
Post, Mar. 18, 1987, at D2, col. 4.
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claiming that the surveillance program would violate the Administrative Procedure Act and the Civil Service Reform Act, and that
the procedures prescribed in the order violated the fourth
amendment.5
Unlike private-sector programs, government-operated surveillance constitutes state action, enabling opponents to invoke the
talismanic protections of the fourth amendment.' Although the essential function of the fourth amendment is to protect citizens
from unjustified and arbitrary government intrusion, "[t]he course
of true law pertaining to [the amendment] . . .has not . . . run
smooth."7 The fourth amendment logically divides into two clauses
and lends itself to a multiplicity of interpretations.8 Since its seminal opinion in Boyd v. United States,' the United States Supreme
Court has struggled to define the relationship between the general
proscription clause, which bars unreasonable searches and the second clause which contains specific mandates of probable cause and
warrant. The result has been an imprecise balancing of governmental and individual interests. Although the Court has strained to establish a preference for warrant-based searches, it also has recognized a separate power for warrantless searches in the general
proscription clause.
Focusing on federal drug surveillance testing in the context of
the warrantless search doctrine, this Note examines the Supreme
Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence and then analyzes current drug surveillance litigation. Closing with a detailed consideration of Executive Order No. 12,564, this Note concludes that executive agency drug surveillance programs that adhere to the
5. National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 651 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. La. 1987) (denying government's motion to dismiss). The National Treasury Employees Union represents
employees of the federal government. The union consists of approximately 120,000 members. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssoCIATIONs 481 (K. Gruber ed. 1987).
6. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (1966).
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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principles of the Executive Order should pass constitutional
muster.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH

Notwithstanding its preeminence during the Revolutionary period,10 the issue of search and seizure lay dormant throughout the
nation's first century. Until the late nineteenth century, statutory
and common law generally confined the use of warrants to the

10. The fourth amendment's strictures on search and seizure were drafted in response to
the Anglo-American experience. Although the common-law origins of the warrant are illdefined, the extensive use of general warrants of search and seizure by Tudor and Stuart
monarchs, primarily to silence criticism in the press, is well documented. See 1 W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-4 (2d ed. 1987); J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 19-48; N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-78 (1970); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-35 (1969).

Virtually uninterrupted by the Protectorate and the Restoration, the widespread use of this
general search power was not curtailed effectively until the middle of the eighteenth cen-

tury. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 24-30; T. TAYLOR, supra, at 25, 34-35. Following two
particularly onerous trials in which the judiciary roundly criticized governmental abuses, the
House of Commons recognized "that general warrants were an arbitrary exercise of governmental authority against which the public had a right to be safeguarded," and severely restricted the Crown's ability to issue them. N. LASSON, supra,at 38-39 (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howard's State Trials 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howard's State Trials
1153 (1763)). See T. TAYLOR, supra, at 34-35. Despite this proscription, the scope of general
arrest warrants and the power to issue writs of assistance remained unimpaired. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 30.
Writs of assistance, although generally not used in England, were the subject of profound
resentment in the American colonies. Issued to the Crown's customs officers, the writs provided unfettered authority to enter buildings in search of contraband. Although no mention
of the writs is found among the grievances enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,
their use was a predominant issue in that era. The organized merchants of Boston, represented by James Otis, Jr., opposed the reissue of these writs upon the ascendance of George
III, and when the Continental Congress petitioned the King for redress of grievances in
1774, abuse of the search power was a prominent issue. See 1 W. LAFAE, supra, at 4; J.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 31; T. TAYLOR, supra, at 35-38.
Preoccupation with the search power extended into the early Federalist period, and when
the Philadelphia Convention submitted its draft of the Constitution for ratification, the lack
of restriction on that power was widely denounced. Before the Convention opened, six of the
thirteen proposed states had adopted constitutions containing bills of rights, each restricting
the use of search warrants. 1 W. LAFAE, supra, at 1-5; J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 38-42;
T. TAYLOR, supra, at 41-44. In response to the widespread criticism, President Washington
urged the first Congress to focus on the addition of such a bill to the Constitution. 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra, at 5. Drafts of the proposed amendments were submitted to the states in
1789, and the Bill of Rights, with its guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, was
ratified in December 1791. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 42.
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seizure of stolen goods or dangerous and adulterated substances. 1
Warrantless searches incident to arrest and in execution of customs inspections went unchallenged."2 Constrained by the infrequent exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction and the absence of
the right to appeal from state criminal proceedings, the Supreme
Court published only four opinions prior to 1886 that considered
the search power. 13 In that year, the Court delivered its opinion in
Boyd v. United States4 and set the course for subsequent fourth
amendment jurisprudence.
In Boyd, the Court rejected the government's assertion that
searches based on a properly issued warrant were per se reasonable.15 Grounding its opinion on the principles of the fourth and
fifth amendments, the Court appeared to narrow the scope of warrant-based searches by applying an overlaid standard of reasonableness.' 6 The Court's focus on the "reasonableness clause" of the
fourth amendment later became the touchstone in its restructuring
of the search and seizure analysis.
Following Boyd, significant procedural changes spawned a
proliferation of search and seizure litigation. In 1891, Congress authorized criminal appeals to the Supreme Court.'7 At the same
time, the federal and state governments began to establish professional police forces and codify criminal procedure. The search warrant was altered concomitantly to a general-purpose law enforce11. See T. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 44.
12. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53 (1926); T. Taylor, supra note 10, at
44.
13. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 49; N. LAssoN, supra note 10, at 106. See Ex Porte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Improvement Corp., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15. Id. at 621-22. The district court had ordered the defendants, merchants accused of
evading tariff payments on certain goods, to surrender invoices documenting the transactions. That order had been issued on the request of the district attorney, pursuant to customs revenue laws. Id. at 617-18. The court held that the compulsory production of private,
incriminating records was an unjustified "invasion of
[the] indefeasible right of personal security." Id. at 630. The Boyd decision effectively created a zone of privacy that
precluded seizure of personal papers otherwise useful as evidence. The Court overturned
this decision, however, in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
16. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622-33.
17. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 8, at 49.
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ment instrument.1 8 With adoption of the exclusionary rule, 19

criminal defendants found both the means and the incentive to
challenge searches, particularly those not supported by warrant.
Faced with these developments and lacking substantial precedent with which to resolve the developing conflicts, courts seized
on Boyd and its inference that a warrant was an essential prerequisite to a finding of reasonableness.20 These courts viewed warrantless searches as inimical to basic protections against arbitrary intrusion, and couched their validations of warrantless searches in
terms of exceptions to the rule.21 By the mid-1960s, the Supreme
Court had allowed so many exceptions that search warrants were
necessary only in special situations.22 The Court's decisions relied
increasingly on the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable intrusions, balancing the justifications for intrusion against the
"indefeasible" right of personal security. The Court thus allowed
the specific requirements of probable cause and warrant to lose
vitality.
Administrative Searches
In Frank v. Maryland,23 the Court expanded the warrantless
search exception to include administrative inspections. The state
of Maryland had convicted and fined a homeowner for interfering
with a city health department inspection of his residence.24 Noting
the common use and historical acceptance of such inspections, the
Court refused to categorize the city's action as a search under the
fourth amendment. 25 It reasoned that administrative inspections
18. T.

TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 45.
19. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. T. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 46.
21. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk searches permitted where
not practicable to secure warrant); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (administrative
searches permitted without warrant) (subsequently overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 532 (1967)); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (search incident to arrest
beyond body of arrestee permitted without warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (search of automobile permitted). The perception that search warrants are the primary safeguard against arbitrary government intrusion belies the framers' original fear of
overreaching general warrants. See T. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 46.
22. T. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 48.
23. 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
24. Id. at 361-62.
25. Id. at 368-73.
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"touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the important interests
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection."26 The
Court limited its holding, however, to a narrowly defined class of
administrative searches that were "hedged about with safeguards
designed to. . .cause. . . the slightest restriction on [the individual's] claim[] of privacy. '2 7 Although the Court's opinion expanded
the reach of reasonable intrusions, its underlying concern with the
relationship between probable cause and the issuance of warrants
was well placed.
Eight years later, in Camara v. Municipal Court,2 s the Supreme
Court reversed Frank and revived the requirement of a general
warrant. Holding that administrative inspections required a warrant in order to establish constitutional validity, the Court declared that a "reasonable government interest," such as community
health and safety, would establish "probable cause to issue a suitably retricted search warrant."29 The dissent argued against adoption of the "synthetic search warrant" rejected in Frank and
chided the majority for failing to recognize the independent po30
tency of the general proscription against unreasonable searches.
Of greatest import in Camara was not the Court's restriction of
the administrative search exception, but rather the Court's willingness to define reasonableness in terms that stopped short of probable cause.3 ' In attempting to provide internal consistency for its
interpretation of the fourth amendment, the Court all but abandoned its construction in Boyd and dramatically reduced the standard of probable cause.

26. Id. at 367. The Court applied the principles and protections of the fourth amendment
against the state through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 365-66.
27. Id.
28. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In a companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967),
the Court also restricted administrative inspections on commercial properties. In light of
exceptions and clarifications issued in later decisions, the vitality of See has been somewhat
diminished. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 593 (1981).
29. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
30. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark was joined
by Justices Harlan and Stewart in a single dissent written for both Camara and See.
31. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-39.
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The Stop and Frisk Doctrine
Just one year after Camara,the Court overtly embraced the general proscription clause as the primary control on government intrusions and reemphasized a less rigorous standard of probable
cause. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court addressed fourth amendment
issues in the context of a procedure known as stop and frisk.32 The
appellant had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon on
the basis of evidence obtained when a Cleveland plainclothes policeman detained him and subjected him to a "pat-down" search. 3
The trial court had denied the appellent's motion to suppress the
evidence, finding that the detective's extended observation of
Terry and two companions provided reasonable suspicion on which
to justify the detention and search 34 The Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's decision to admit the evidence. Focusing on the
intrusiveness of the detention and pat-down, the Court enunciated
a two-tier test of reasonableness. Against Justice Douglas's lone
dissent,3 5 the Court declared that a warrantless search was constitutionally valid if it "was justified in its inception, and. . reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."3 " In balancing the government's interest
in law enforcement against the individual's right to be free from
government intrusion, the Court held that the policeman's extended observation of Terry provided sufficient "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts," warranted the initial intrusion.37 The Court then validated the stop and frisk procedure by characterizing the pat-down
search as minimally intrusive and reasonably related to the policeman's interest in self-protection. 8

32. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Stop and frisk describes an on-the-street stop, cursory interrogation, and pat-down search for weapons. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 4-7.
34. Id. at 5-9.
35. Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 30-31.
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Inherent in the Court's reasoning in Terry is a sliding-scale analysis of reasonableness, 9 in which "the specific content and incidents of [fourth amendment rights] must be shaped by the context
in which [they are] asserted. ' 40 After Terry, the fourth amendment
did not bar all intrusions, but acted merely as a limitation on the
scope of justifiable searches. This balancing approach articulated
in Terry has been applied broadly to justify warrantless searches,4 1
creating a continuum of such lesser standards as reasonable suspicion or belief, 42 preservation of time-sensitive evidence, 43 application of standardized procedures involving neutral criteria,44 de
minimis or nonintrusive searches, 45 and even per se reasonableness.46 The result of this balancing approach has been to deemphasize the fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause
and focus instead on the reasonableness of the intrusion. 7 A
proper analysis of federal drug surveillance programs thus requires
that these programs be scrutinized within the sliding scale of
reasonableness.

39. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, quoted in Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466,
476 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) ("where a
careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is
best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, [the court has] not hesitated to adopt such a standard").
41. Fifteenth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal, 1984-1985, 74 GEo. L.J. 499, 512-13 (1986).
42. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (search of high school student); Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (stop and
frisk search).
43. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (blood alcohol testing).
44. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (administrative
inspections).
45. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (fingerprints); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 8-18 (1973) (voice exemplars).
46. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (border search).
47. "The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures
be reasonable, and although 'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,. ..in certain limited circumstances neither
is required.'" New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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APPLICATION TO FEDERAL DRUG TESTING: STRIKING THE BALANCE

Analysis Under Terry v. Ohio
The constitutional validity of federal drug testing under the
Court's analysis of search and seizure will depend largely on the
treatment given to threshold issues. Absent some action that can
properly be classified as a "search" or "seizure", the fourth amendment's protections against unreasonable intrusion will not be implicated.48 In that context, "search" and "seizure" become terms of
art that afford courts broad discretion in interpretation.4 9 Although
proponents of drug surveillance testing may attempt to seize on

the limits of these terms to exclude drug testing from the umbrella
of constitutional protection, this focus is misplaced and serves only
to truncate the Terry analysis. Such an approach fails to consider
the broad spectrum of factors that might justify or preclude
intrusion.
The first level of the Terry analysis requires a delicate balance
between the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and
those government interests underlying the intrusion. Factors examined in this balancing should include the scope of the privacy
expectation, the frequency of the conduct subject to control or intrusion, and the quality of the government interests involved.50
Viewed in this manner, the reasonableness standard may also require courts to measure the factual justification for intrusion
against an objective standard of cause. 1
Contrary to Justice Brennan's assertion that government interests must be extraordinary before courts can legitimately engage in
a balancing test, 52 the judiciary has routinely justified intrusions

on the basis of interests characterized as merely important or sub48. See, e.g., Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
49. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). "A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed"; a seizure takes
place only if there is "some meaningful interference with the individual's possessory interests in that property." Id. at 113.
50. See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1010 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J.,
concurring); Defendant's Opening Brief at 34-38, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
51. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
52. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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stantial53 Broad expectations of privacy have limited recognition5 4
because society demands that an individual surrender some degree
of privacy to advance the community's broader interests.25 Courts
therefore have recognized a wide range of circumstances in which
limited intrusion is justified. These include situations of pervasive
regulation, 56 government employment that explicitly limits individual privacy expectations, 57 and statutory authorization of unannounced regulatory inspections.5 8 The goal of eliminating drug
abuse in the federal workplace may well be viewed as another circumstance justifying intrusion into an individual's privacy expectations. The Supreme Court has characterized drug abuse prevention
as a strong state interest.59 When applied to federal employees,
that interest is reinforced by the collateral concerns of the effective
discharge of government responsibilities, 0 the nature of employees' duties,6 ' internal order and discipline, 2 and minimization of
the public's exposure to risk. 3

53. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mineworker's health and safety a substantial interest); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979) (public confidence in government official's integrity an important interest).
54. See generally Banzhaf, How To Make Drug Tests Pass Muster, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12,
1987, at 13.
55. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985).
56. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); Shoemaker v. Handel,
795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
57. Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding constitutionality
of Ethics in Government Act requirement that certain officials file personal financial statement annually), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349
(5th Cir. 1977) (prison's general warning of entry search policy applied even to federal corrections officer); United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
989 (1975) (upholding regulation limiting privacy interest in lockers assigned to postal employees); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), afj'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir.
1967) (upholding regulations limiting privacy expectation of U.S. Mint employees).
58. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (upholding inspection of underground mines
pursuant to Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977).
59. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1983) (validating "canine sniff" search).
60. See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960
(1966); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
61. See Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 120 (2d
Cir. 1987).
62. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351-52 (1985); Committee for GI Rights, 518
F.2d at 474-75; Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
63. See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. App. 1985).
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Balanced against government motivations is the individual's expectation of privacy; 4 in this instance, security of the body. Urination normally occurs in private, and "[o]ne does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it available to
others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal
physiological secrets it holds."65 Although the Supreme Court has
clearly established that individuals retain a privacy expectation as
to the integrity of their bodies, the Court has sanctioned intrusions
such as the forced taking of blood samples. 6 In spite of the fundamental nature of the privacy interest at issue, a sufficient government interest therefore may validate a limited intrusion under the
auspices of a drug surveillance program.
The conclusion that the Constitution permits urinalysis testing
under some circumstances leads logically to the second tier of the
analysis. After finding that an intrusion is justified in its inception,
the court must scrutinize the scope of the interference with respect
to the circumstances underlying the justification. This second level
of analysis has generally functioned as the barrier to drug surveillance programs. In the context of a non-drug-related fourth
amendment claim, the Supreme Court held that "a search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive. ' 6' 7 Fraught with catchwords, this phrase encompasses the

mechanisms and means of search, the dissemination and use of
findings, the impact on the individual subject to the intrusion, and
any controls on the frequency of the interference. This broad range
of factors is complicated by the subjective interpretation of legal
scholars, the varying purposes and circumstances surrounding implementation of surveillance programs, and a dearth of Supreme
Court decisions on the issue. The result has been a collection of
64. Such an expectation of privacy has two components: first, the actual or subjective
expectation of the individual, and second, "that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring). For the purposes of this Note, the subjective expectation of privacy is
presumed.
65. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809
F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
66. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
67. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
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diverse lower court opinions on the constitutionality of drug surveillance programs.
RECENT URINALYSIS CASES: SCOPE OF THE INTRUSION AND UNDERLYING POLICIES

Several recent cases have involved a challenge to drug surveillance programs that include urinalysis. The next section will focus
on the scope of intrusions permitted by the courts as well as the
policies underlying these decisions.
Early decisions involving drug surveillance testing of military
personnel6 8 and public transportation employees6 9 validated such
intrusions and provided the foundation on which subsequent decisions rest. In Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, several enlisted members of the Army's European Command filed a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the drug abuse
prevention plan initiated by the Secretary of Defense. 70 The program, which was implemented by directive, mandated treatment
for personnel found to be drug abusers. It also provided for administrative and disciplinary action when circumstances indicated a violation of the law or Army regulations.7 ' In addition, the program
authorized military authorities to inform other government agencies, on request, when individuals were discharged for illicit drug
72
use.
Although Callaway's concern with the rights of military personnel limits its precedential value, it is instructive in its use of the
Terry analysis. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit emphasized that military personnel were
"entitled to the protection[s] of the Fourth Amendment, '7' but rejected warrant procedures as an unduly burdensome precondition
on the unannounced inspections authorized under the plan. In
reaching its decision, the court noted that an absolute warrant re-

68. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
69. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
70. Committee for GI Rights, 518 F.2d at 468.
71. Id. at 468-70.
72. Id. at 470.
73. Id. at 476.

1987]

DRUG-FREE FEDERAL WORKPLACE

quirement would undermine the effectiveness of such inspections. 4
Focusing on the Army's national security mission, the court declared that the "fundamental necessity for obedience . . . may
render permissible within the military that which would be consti'75
tutionally impermissible outside of it."
After determining that the reasonableness standard applied, 76
the court embarked on a balancing test to determine the validity of
the intrusion. It weighed the increased incidence of drug abuse in
the armed forces, the underlying concern for health and fitness,
and the Army's attempts to minimize the impact of the inspection
on individual dignity and privacy against the privacy expectations
retained by the service members. The court concluded that the
challenged searches were "reasonable and constitutionally
'77
permissible.
Just one year later, the ambit of drug surveillance testing was
extended to public transportation employees. In a terse, four-page
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected a union challenge to a Chicago Transit Authority regulation in Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy.78
The regulation required employees to submit to blood and urine
testing if they were involved in "any serious accident" or were suspected of being intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics.7 9
Both the refusal to submit to testing and positive test results were
grounds for discharge.80 Because the Transit Authority administered the test on the basis of articulable suspicion, the court applied a balancing test to weigh the government interest against the
employees' "reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to submitting to blood and urine tests." 81 The court concluded that the
Transit Authority's "paramount interest" in the safety of mass

74. Id. at 477.
75. Id. at 474.
76. Id. at 476 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 378 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)).
77. Id. at 476-77.
78. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
79. Id at 1266-67.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1267 (citing United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)).
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transit customers "certainly outweigh[ed] any individual interest
in refusing to disclose evidence of . . .drug abuse." 2
After Suscy, drug surveillance litigation lay dormant for nearly a
decade. Its resurgence began with a pro se challenge to the urinalysis program instituted in the New York State prison system. In
Storms v. Coughlin,8 four inmates of the Ossining Corrections Facility attacked the procedures used to select and subject prisoners
to a program of daily, random drug testing."' The plaintiffs asserted that the system used to generate random test subjects was
constitutionally infirm and challenged the intrusiveness of sample
collection methods and the reliability of the Syva EMIT (Enzyme
Multiplied Immunoassay Technique) testing process.8 5 The court
applied a Terry analysis and ruled that the intrusion on human
dignity and privacy consequent to urinalysis testing was substantially outweighed by the legitimate goal of internal security and
the policies of the correctional facility."6 The court reserved judgement however, on the challenge to the Syva EMIT test. Although
it found that the reliability of the test had not adversely affected
the plaintiffs, it intimated that a consideration of this factor would
be proper in the second tier of a Terry analysis. 7
The lone infirmity found in the New York system was the
method of generating random test subjects. Corrections officers
would choose the particular prisoners to be tested each day by
"randomly" selecting name cards from a tote board in the office.8 8
82. Id.
83. 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
84 Id. at 1216.
85 Id. at 1216-17. The Syva EMIT test operates on a biochemical principal. Antibodies
that react to trace elements of drugs are added to the urine sample. A photometer is used to
measure the resulting substance, which is then compared against known values to indicate
the presence or absence of drugs in the urine. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and
the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Pirr. L. REv. 203, 205 n.12 (1986).
86. Id. at 1218, 1221. Although convicted prisoners do not surrender all constitutional
protections on incarceration, their status and the need for internal order in prisons limit
those retained rights. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979). Although somewhat
discomforting, the analogy is clear: by their status as employees of the government, personnel in particularly sensitive positions must yield some portion of their privacy expectation in
favor of government interests.
87. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1225-26. The court noted that the plaintiffs could still chal-

lenge the use of the EMIT test under the fourth amendment. Id.
88. Id. at 1216.
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Noting the risks of abuse and unnecessary harrassment inherent in
that system, the court ordered prison officials to discontinue its
use."' The court did not address the constitutionality of a computer program being developed by prison officials to effect a truly
random selection process.90 The result of Judge Haight's decision
was not to invalidate the New York system entirely, but merely to
define the scope and mechanics of a constitutionally valid testing
program.
The next challenge to drug surveillance testing occured in Allen
v. City of Marietta."' Six employees of a municipal utility service
challenged their discharge for drug abuse. Each plaintiff had submitted a urine sample that had tested positive for the presence of
marijuana trace elements. The city had initiated the testing after a
utility superintendent noted a correlation between personnel identified by an informant as drug abusers and a series of unexplained
injuries.9 2 Rather than grounding its opinion in the causal issue,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia relied on a "government employee" exception to the warrant
requirement.9 3 The court balanced the employees' expectation of
privacy against the government's rights as an employer and its
concern for the safety of its employees and the public. 94 Declaring
that "the government has the.

. .

right.

. .

to oversee its employ-

ees and investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's performance of his duties," the court held that employees
retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of a government search conducted "for the proprietary purpose of preventing future damage to the agency's ability to discharge effectively
its statutory responsibilities.

'9 5

The only limitation on the city's

broad authority to investigate matters affecting employee perform-

89. Id. at 1226.
90. Id. at 1216, 1223. Drawing conclusions from the tenor of Judge Haight's opinion, it is
logical to conclude that if the computer program had been installed at the time of the challenge, the court would not have ruled the New York program unconstitutional.
91. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
92. Id. at 484.
93. Id. at 489.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 491.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:215

ance was a prohibition on inquiries undertaken primarily for a
criminal investigatory purpose."6
The Allen opinion at first appears to sanction testing only when
based on evidence of on-the-job use. 7 Evidence offered regarding
off-duty use, the breadth of the court's language, and the strength
of the government's interest, however, may indicate a contrary
conclusion. When a sufficient nexus exists between off-duty use
and on-the-job performance, courts should logically be able to expand the scope of intrusion. Such a nexus clearly exists when the
employee uses a drug outside the workplace and subsequently reports for work while subject to any of the drug's physiological or
psychological effects.9 8 A special relationship between off-duty activities and on-the-job responsibilities thus may justify expanding
the scope of surveillance.
Perhaps the most influential urinalysis decision to date, McDon9 arose on a challenge to an Iowa Department
ell v. Hunter,"
of Corrections policy that subjected employees to various searches, including blood and urine testing. 0 0 At the outset of its opinion, the
court tersely rejected the Department's suggestion that fourth
amendment protections were not implicated when the search was
not incident to a criminal investigation. 10 ' Applying the Terry

96. Id.
97. See Miller, supra note 85, at 221.
98. See Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983). In its analysis of service connection, a jurisdictional matter, the court addressed off-duty (off-the-job) use and performance,
stating:
[I]ndeed, in many instances the drug[s] will enter the military installation in
their most lethal form-namely, when they are coursing through the body of a
user. ...
We are convinced that, even when a servicemember uses a psychoactive drug
in private while he is on extended leave far away from any military installation, that use is service connected, if he later enters a military installation
while subject to any physiological or psychological effects of the drug.
Id. at 80 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980)).
The court's logic here reflects the overall concern with drug abuse-the physiological and
psychological impact on work performance. An on-the-job limitation of objective standards
of suspicion ignores that concern.
99. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 1125.
101. Id. at 1127. Note the similarity between the Department's position and the court's
limitation on authorized search authority in Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491
(N.D. Ga. 1985).
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analysis, the court found that the paramount justification for the
Department's testing policy was security in the corrections facility
and held that this interest was sufficient to reduce the scope of
employees' reasonable expectations of privacy.01 2 The court did not
doubt that the Department could constitutionally search all persons entering correctional facilities, but held that the Iowa program was so intrusive as to preclude validation.10 3
The fundamental flaw in the Iowa program was a lack of standards for implementation and testing.104 Without any enumerated
guidelines, "it appear[ed] that any institutional officer [could] authorize or make a search or demand for blood or urine. . .[with]
unfettered discretion." 10 5 That flaw was not sufficiently neutralized
by the Department's assertion that employees were not "asked to
submit to [testing] unless there [was] some articulable reason to
believe" a problem existed. 08 The court concluded that a foundation of "reasonable suspicion" had to underlie any testing.10 This
standard has since become the lynchpin in any analysis of drug
surveillance programs. 108
The final challenges to drug surveillance testing in 1985 took
place at the state level. In City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, the Florida District Court of Appeals modified and affirmed a permanent
injunction that prohibited the city from conducting urinalysis testing of police officers and firefighters. 0 9 Balancing the coextensive
nature of the employees' private and professional lives with the
government's interest in employee and public safety, the court
held that all drug surveillance testing not performed as part of a
routine medical examination had to be based on the reasonable
suspicion standard articulated in McDonell. 0° The court of appeals also expanded the time during which employees were subject

102. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1128.
103. Id. at 1128-29.
104. Id. at 1128 n.4.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1126.
107. Id. at 1130.
108. See, e.g., City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1985).
109. Id. at 1323.
110. Id. at 1324-26. The court of appeals rejected the lower court's mandate of probable
cause as the objective standard.
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to suspicion to include off-duty periods.11 ' The court based its rejection of an on-the-job use limitation on the indefinite boundaries
between the private and public lives of firefighters and police
officers.' 12
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals employed a similar
analysis in Turner v. FraternalOrder of Police,"" in which it validated urinalysis testing of police officers. That court held that police officers, because of the nature of their duties and their impact
on public safety, retained a diminished privacy expectation." 4 In
striking a balance between public and individual interests, the
court affirmed the propriety of a testing system that subjected officers to urinalysis testing on reasonable suspicion founded in objective fact." 5 Turner apparently follows Bauman in rejecting an
on-the-job limitation to surveillance. Although the court did not
specifically address the issue, the requirement that testing be related merely to fitness indicates that no such on-the-job limitation
was placed on the reasonable suspicion standard." 6
Drug surveillance litigation proliferated in 1986, with courts delivering opinions in nearly twenty cases. 11 The challenged programs ranged from testing of teachers who sought tenure" 8 to
urinalysis of Customs Service officers prior to promotion." 9 Only
one court invalidated drug surveillance testing in its entirety. 2 0
Other programs faced limitations ranging from a relatively high

111. Id. at 1326.
112. Miller, supra note 85, at 226.
113. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985).
114. Id. at 1008.
115. Id. at 1008-09.
116. Id. at 1009. See also Miller, supra note 85, at 227.
117. See Banzhaf, supra note 54, at 24.
118. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1987).
119. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
120. That decision subsequently was vacated. Id.
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probable cause standard l" l to reasonable suspicion 1 22 to a relaxed
123
standard requiring no causal showing.

In Jones v. McKenzie,12 4 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia considered a bus attendant's challenge to
dismissal for alleged drug abuse. The District of Columbia school
system initiated urinalysis testing of employees in 1984 because of
a significant increase in absenteeism and the discovery of drug paraphernalia in employee restrooms. 125 The program provided for
urinalysis screening as a part of regular physical exams and also
called for termination of employment on a confirmed finding of il26
licit drug use.

The plaintiff in Jones was discharged after a computerized
EMIT urinalysis and a manual repetition of'the same test detected
the presence of drug residues in her urine. 2 7 The salient factor in
the district court's reversal of the discharge was the school system's failure to make adequate provision for confirmation of the
initial test result. Although the court could have relied on Terry to
reverse the plaintiff's discharge,' it grounded its opinion instead
on procedural due process. The directive implementing the urinalysis program required confirmation of a positive test result before
the employee was dismissed. The court noted that both the manufacturer of the EMIT test and other toxicology authorities recommended confirmation by an alternate test method.' 9
121. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986) (testing of school bus
attendant).
122. Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (police officers); Lovvorn v.
City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (city firefighters); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (firefighters); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers, 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888; King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, 502
N.Y.S.2d 679 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840, 507 N.E.2d 296, 514
N.Y.S.2d 703 (1987) (corrections officers); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d
789 (1986) (police officers and Organized Crime Bureau personnel).
123. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986)
(horse racing industry).
124. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
125. Id. at 1502.
126. Id. at 1502-03.
127. Id at 1503.
128. Id. at 1504-07.
129. Id at 1505-06.
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Citing various organizations and courts that had rejected the use
of the immunoassay as the sole testing process, the court ruled
that manual repetition of the EMIT procedure was not sufficient
to confirm positive test results. 130 On that basis, the court overruled the plaintiff's termination as "arbitrary and capricious" and
clearly in violation of the directive and applicable law.13 ' As an adjunct to its due process analysis, the court examined the plaintiff's
fourth amendment claims. Loosely embracing the second tier of
the Terry analysis, it concluded that a higher objective standard
than "reasonable suspicion" had to be met in order to justify intrusion into a bus attendant's privacy.3 2
On its face, the district court's decision appears to be limited to
its facts: because the District of Columbia school system failed to
comply with its regulations regarding discharge of employees, the
plaintiff's due process rights were violated. A closer reading of
Jones, however, reveals its import to the topic of this Note. A
number of drug surveillance challenges have focused on the reliability of the EMIT test, and opinions have been sharply divided.'
The reliability of the urinalysis testing process and its impact on
the individual are factors that clearly fall within the second tier of
the Terry analysis. In light of the Jones decision, drug surveillance
programs should include procedures for testing specimens by at
least two different testing processes.
On the heels of the apparent retrenchment in Jones, a federal
district court in New York validated the constitutionality of drug
surveillance testing. In Mack v. United States,3 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York balanced an investigative agent's privacy expectation against the interests of his employer, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The court recognized the FBI's compelling and vital interest in
protecting classified information and national security, as well as
the Bureau's interest in assuring that agents were not subject to

130. Id. at 1506. Cf. Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1509-14, 1514 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (repetition of EMIT testing validated); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35, 38-39 (D.N.D.
1984) (reliance solely on EMIT test does not violate due process).
131. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1506.
132. Id at 1508.
133. Id. at 1505-07.
134. 653 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987).
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compromise and corruption due to drug abuse.'3 5 The court ruled
that the plaintiff's special employment relationship with the FBI,
as well as its published drug abuse policy, limited his privacy interests. 136 Finding the methods used for collection of the urine sample
to be minimally intrusive, it held that the search was reasonable
37
under the fourth amendment.
Three months later, in Shoemaker v. Handel, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered a New Jersey
Racing Commission regulation that permitted the State Racing
38
Steward to subject jockeys to breathalyzer and urinalysis testing.
In the underlying case, the federal district court had explicitly per39
formed the two-step Terry analysis in upholding the regulation.1
That court had ruled that the pervasive regulation of the horse
racing industry, along with New Jersey's strong interests in the integrity and safety of the sport, justified the challenged intrusion. 4 0
The district court did not directly address the intrusiveness of
drug surveillance testing, choosing instead to balance the program's strict controls, purpose, and confidentiality against the
jockey's diminished expectation of privacy.''
Rather than adopting the district court's construction of the
case, the court of appeals grounded its opinion on the administrative search exception. " 2 This approach did not substantively alter
the Terry analysis, however, because it required a balancing between public and private interests and a finding of reasonableness
as to the scope of the intrusion. 43 Here the Third Circuit followed
the district court's reasoning and held that the challenged testing
44
was constitutionally valid.1

135. Id. at 75.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
139. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1102 (D.N.J. 1985), alI'd,795 F.2d 1136 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1101-04.
142. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1136. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 1142. Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1978) (requiring
warrant pursuant to OSHA inspection).
144. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142-43.
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Shoemaker's true importance lies in its validation of random
testing, in which the normal prerequisite of individualized suspicion is discarded. The district court had recognized that prerequisite as a means to ensure proper balancing between public goals
and individual privacy interests. 14 5 The court, however, also declared that
"[i]n those situations in which the balance of interests precludes
insistance upon 'some quantum of individualized suspicion,'
other safeguards are generally relied upon to insure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the

discretion of the official in the field.'

1146

Without elaborating on the factors that precluded the use of the
individualized suspicion standard in this case, the court ruled that
the purpose, strict confidentiality, and detailed administrative procedures of the Racing Commission's drug surveillance program afforded adequate protection against unconstrained discretion. 4' 7
Similarly, the court of appeals offered little to substantiate or
explain the elimination of the objective standard in its conclusory
treatment of the random testing issue. 148 Considered in the context
of the decisions that preceded Shoemaker, the opinions of the district court and the court of appeals defy the logic that governments must justify random testing with interests of significantly
greater magnitude than those presented by the New Jersey Racing
Commission.
In Capua v. City of Plainfield4 9 and Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,'50 problems with detailed administrative regulation and the
scope of discretion led to the invalidation of drug surveillance testing of public safety officers. In Capua, city officials subjected officers of the city police and fire departments to mandatory urinalysis testing without prior notice.' 5' Officials administering the test
observed the collection process and those officers whose samples

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1100.
Id. at 1101 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
Id. at 1101-04.
Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142-43.
643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1511-12.
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revealed the presence of controlled substances were forced to resign and threatened with criminal sanction. 152 Prior to conducting
the tests, the city had promulgated no written directive, department policy, or regulation to establish the basis of testing or prescribe standards and procedures for the use of test results."5 3
In its analysis of the challenged action, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey characterized the government's interest in the safety of its officers and the public as a vital
and laudable goal154 and balanced that interest against the officers'
privacy expectations. The court characterized the observation of
the collection process as a breach of bodily integrity and the greatest possible invasion of privacy, and held that the government's
relatively innocuous interest in the public's perception of its safety
officers was not sufficient to justify such an intrusion. 1 55 The court
suggested that even had the government's interest weighed more
heavily toward justification of the intrusion, the Plainfield program
would nonetheless have been invalidated because it did not provide sufficient notice, clearly delineated methods, or adequate procedural safeguards. 156 Finally, the court distinguished the facts in
Capua from those that had justified the administrative search exception in Shoemaker.157 The court found that the Plainfield fire
and police departments were not subject to pervasive regulation
and thus retained a greater privacy interest than the jockeys in
Shoemaker. 58 On the basis of these judgments, the court determined that drug surveillance screening not based on an individualized suspicion was unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. 159
The Capua decision is flawed in its balancing of individual and
government interests because it failed to consider adequately the
city's interest in the-safety of both its employees and the public. A
proper application of the Terry analysis, however, probably would
not have achieved a different result. As the United States Supreme

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

1512.
1511-12.
1511.
1519.
1511.
1518.
1519.
1520.
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Court stated in Bell v. Wolfish, "[t]he test of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application.' e0 It is a fact-oriented analysis16 that requires the court to balance discrete factors subjectively.
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, the United States District
Court for the District of Tennessee considered facts strikingly similar to those in Capua. After engaging in the Terry analysis, the
court invalidated the Chattanooga drug testing program for lack of
clearly defined standards and methods. 6 2 The court in Lovvorn
recognized that firefighters had a "somewhat diminished expection
of privacy"' 163 in the face of the city's compelling interest in a drugfree fire department, 6 4 but held nevertheless that in "the absence
of [adequate] safeguards to insure that the tests [were] not subject
to the standardless discretion of. .. fire officials' 65 the city could
interfere with employees' privacy interests only66 on the basis of an
objective standard of individualized suspicion.
In a challenge that may have a great impact on the administration's plan for a drug-free federal workplace, the National Treasury Employees Union attacked the constitutionality of a drug
testing program implemented by the United States Customs Service. 67 That program required Customs Service employees who
sought promotion to certain positions to submit to urinalysis drug
testing. In order to prevent falsification or adulteration of samples,
the implementing directive and mandated "close but not 'direct'"
observation during the sample collection process.6 "
In granting injunctive and declaratory relief, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana characterized
urinalysis testing as "utterly repugnant to the . .

.

.Constitution"

160. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
161. Id.
162. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
163. Id. at 880.
164. Id. at 879.
165. Id. at 882.
166. Id.
167. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
168. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 382 (E.D. La.
1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987). Employees provided their samples free from
direct visual observation, but with an observer in the restroom with them. 816 F.2d at 173-
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and held that the Customs Service's drug surveillance plan violated its employees' fourth amendment and due process rights.169
The district court dismissed the significance of the Service's interest in a drug-free environment 170 and found urinalysis testing to be
such a gross and degrading invasion of privacy that it constituted
an overly intrusive interference.? 1 In addition, the court ruled that
the testing processes, the Syva EMIT and gas-chromatography/
mass-spectrometry tests, were "so fraught with dangers of false
... readings as to deny the Customs workers due process of
law.

17 2

The court order permanently enjoined the Customs Ser-

vice from conducting urinalysis testing without a showing of probable cause.17

The district court's analysis in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab is disjointed and undisciplined, and fails to
balance adequately the interests involved. The court's finding that
illicit drug use presented no threat to legitimate government inter17 4
ests ignores the law enforcement mission of the Customs Service.
Despite the subjective nature of the reasonableness analysis, the
Customs Service's interest in a drug-free law enforcement agency
should justify some degree of intrusion. In light of previous case
law,17 5 the district court's treatment of the government's interests
in National Treasury Employees Union and its mandate of a
probable cause standard appear unsupportable.
169. National Treasury Employees Union, 649 F. Supp. at 386-89, 391. The court also
ruled that the program violated Customs employees' fifth amendment rights and rejected
any consent granted as tainted by coercion. Id. at 387-88. The testimonial and communicative nature of urinalysis testing will not be discussed here, as the ambit of this Note is
limited to the fourth amendment and immediately related issues presented by drug surveillance testing.
170. Id. at 390.
171. Id. at 387.
172. Id. at 390.
173. Id. at 391.
174. The Customs Service is a law enforcement agency charged with preventing illicit
drugs from entering the United States. Service members are sometimes required to carry
firearms or have access to classified information. See National Treasury Employees Union,
816 F.2d at 173.
175. E.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (city's
compelling interest in drug-free fire department would justify urinalysis drug testing based
on reasonable suspicion).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:215

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis and vacated the injunction. e Although the court did not apply the Terry analysis in its
traditional two-tier format, each of the test's essential elements
was examined. The court found that the use of controlled substances by Customs Service employees frustrated that agency's law
enforcement function, undermined the Service's integrity, and
posed a serious safety threat. 17 7 It deemed those factors sufficient
to justify the intrusion of drug surveillance testing.17 8 In support of
that conclusion, the court noted that the "test [was], to some extent, consensual"' 7 9 and pointed to the government's right to assure the integrity and competence of its workforce.' s0
In its review of the scope and manner of testing, the program's
administrative strictures, and the scientific processes employed,
the court found no factors that would render the contemplated
search unreasonable.' 8 ' Of greatest import in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion is the court's limited consideration of the individualized
suspicion standard. Noting that "[i]n certain limited situations,
the balance of interests precludes insistence upon 'some quantum
of individualized suspicion,' "182 the court weighed the government's interest in ensuring the integrity of employees in sensitive
positions against the employees' expectation of privacy, and refused to uphold the district court's requirement of an individualized standard of probable cause.' 8 3 This most recent rejection of a
probable cause standard is in accord with the first urinalysis decision published in 1987.
In McDonell v. Hunter, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit approved the use of "reasonable suspicion" as
the individualized standard, but rejected its application in cases

176. National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 182.
177. Id. at 178.
178. Id.
179. Id. The test was required only of those employees who sought transfers to certain
positions. Id.
180. Id. See also Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (city's interest in safety of its employees and public justified urinalysis drug testing program).
181. National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 175-180.
182. Id. at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
183. See id. at 176-80.
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involving "limited uniform and random testing. ' 184 Focusing on
the status of corrections officers as government employees, the
court of appeals found that warrantless searches "directly relevant
to the employee's performance of his duties and the government's
performance of its duties" were reasonable and constitutionally
valid. 18 5 In reaching its decision, the court held that "the state's
interest in safeguarding the security of its correctional institutions" was at least as strong as the state interest presented in
Shoemaker v. Handel,8 6 and that corrections officers retained a
diminished expection of privacy due to the special responsibilities
of their occupation. 18 7 The court then ruled that uniform and systematic random testing was the least intrusive and only satisfactory means justified by the public interest.'
Although the court of appeals in McDonell failed to specify the
administrative requirements of such a testing system, it implicitly
adopted the procedures used in Shoemaker. Declaring that
"[s]election must not be arbitrary or discriminatory,"' 8 9 the court
ordered that strict guidelines be established to protect confidentiality and ensure reliability. 190 Implicitly recognizing the concerns
noted by the court in Allen v. City of Marietta,'9' the court of
appeals rejected the district court's on-the-job use limitation and
held that testing was permissible when the government suspected
that illicit drug use had occurred within twenty-four hours of the
192
required test.

184. McDonelU v.Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987).
185. Id. (citing United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Allen v. City
of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489-90 (N.D. Ga. 1985)).
186. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
187. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1306 (quoting Security and Law Enforcement Employees
Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 1984)).
188. Id. at 1308.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1309.
191. 601 F. Supp. 482, 489-91 (N.D. Ga. 1985). See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying
text.
192. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1309.
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THE DRUG-FREE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER

Executive Order No. 12,564 is a broad statement of presidential
findings and policy issued to demonstrate federal leadership in
combatting drug abuse. Although it is not an implementing directive by itself, the order grants authority to heads of executive
agencies to "establish a program to test for the use of illegal drugs
by employees in sensitive positions." 193 Although the directive allows some discretion in determining the criteria and extent of testing,19 4 that authority is circumscribed by judicial standards delimiting the scope of drug surveillance programs.
In order to establish the principles on which the federal drug
surveillance program rests, the President prefaced the text of the
order by enumerating nearly a dozen policy goals the administration seeks to achieve. These include preserving bureaucratic efficiency, maintaining public confidence, protecting against threats to
public and employee health and safety, and preventing the compromise of national security and law enforcement. 19 5 Based on

these policies, the order requires each executive agency to establish
a drug surveillance program that affords "due consideration of the
rights of the government, the employee, and the general public."' 96
With the broad objective of eliminating illicit drug use by federal
employees, the order specifies general agency responsibilities, procedures, administrative
standards, and the grounds for testing
97
employees.1

Agency Responsibilities
The President's order specifically assigns responsibilities for
both internal programs and government-wide coordination. Section
two of the order charges agency heads to develop surveillance programs consisting of four basic elements: training of supervisory
personnel in identification and control of illicit drug use, provision
for employee self-referral and supervisory referral, an Employee
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889, 32,890 (1986).
Id.
Id., 51 Fed. Reg. at 32,889.
Id., 51 Fed. Reg. at 32,890.
Id.
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Assistance Program to coordinate rehabilitation, and identification
of illegal drug use via "testing on a controlled and carefully monitored basis."' 198 The directive also requires each agency plan to include a statement of policy that addresses "expectations regarding
drug use and the action to be anticipated in response to identified
drug use."' 19
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management is further
charged with developing a model Employee Assistance Program,
ensuring that appropriate coverage for drug abuse is included in
the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, and coordinating
the government's drug awareness and education program. 00 The
order also directs the Attorney General of the United States to review agency programs and provide advice on implementation of
these programs.20 ' The Secretary of Health and Human Services is
authorized to promulgate scientific and technical guidelines for
202
testing.
With the exception of the policy statement, the above-noted provisions are not directly attributable to urinalysis case precedent.
Although the policy statement may have been a reaction to the
concerns regarding notice enunciated in Capua v. City of Plainfield,20 ' the distribution of agency responsibilities and general program outlines apparently are intended as a general plan to create
an efficient, rehabilitation-based program to eradicate the effect of
illicit drug use on federal agencies.
Programs, Procedures, and Administrative Actions
Sections three through five of the order detail the elements of
the federal drug surveillance plan that are critical to analysis of a
fourth amendment challenge. The order sets forth those factors
that make up the first step of the Terry analysis: justification for
intrusion on the individual's privacy. It directs agency heads to es198. Id.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
643

51
51
51
F.

Fed. Reg. at 32,892.
Fed. Reg. at 32,890.
Fed. Reg. at 32,891.
Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). In characterizing the intrusiveness of urinalysis

testing, the court found the absence of notice of testing and procedures to be critical. Id. at
1511-12.
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tablish testing programs "based upon the nature of the agency's
mission and its employees' duties. . . and the danger to the public
health and safety or national security that could result from the
failure of an employee adequately to discharge his or her position. ' 20 4 This language clearly requires the agency head to quantify
and balance the government's interests against those of the employee. In order to support the system of supervisory and self-referral, the order also prescribes a voluntary testing plan. 0 5
The order authorizes employee testing in five specified circumstances: voluntary submission, follow-up to counselling or rehabilitation through the Employee Assistance Program, reasonable suspicion that an employee has used illegal drugs, examination
subsequent to an accident or unsafe practice, and application for
employment. 20 6 A sixth circumstance justifying testing-random
screening-can be inferred from the structure and language of the
order. 0 7 Voluntary and follow-up testing are firmly grounded in
principles of consent. The objective criteria of reasonable suspicion
and post-accident examinations flow directly from McDonell v.
Hunter20 8 and Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Suscy, 209 respectively. Although four of these circumstances appear
to justify intrusion, both testing of applicants and random surveillance programs require additional scrutiny.
Although not presented with the issue at trial, the district court
in McDonell addressed job applicant testing with a footnote.
Amending its holding that urinalysis testing required a basis of
reasonable suspicion, the court declared that "[tihe Fourth
Amendment.. . does not preclude taking a body fluid specimen
204. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. at 32,890 (1986).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. Section 3(c) states, in part: "[i]n addition to the testing authorized in subsections
(a) and (b) of this section, the head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee for illegal drug use under the following circumstances. . . ." Id. Subsection (a) mentions no specific circumstances authorizing testing; subsection (b) addresses voluntary testing. Id. Because subsection (c) authorizes testing on the basis of reasonable suspicion of use,
as part of a post-accident examination, and during the course of rehabilitation through the
Employee Assistance Program, authority to test under subsection (a) necessarily extends
beyond those boundaries. The language regarding frequency and criteria for testing in subsection (a) may be broad enough to allow for random urinalysis testing.
208. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
209. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
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as part of a pre-employment physical. '210 The court offered no rationale for this assertion, but the fact that such specimens are normally required for a full physical examination supports the court's
position.2 11 Further, without benefit of an on-the-job observation,
the potential employer has no less intrusive means by which to
protect its interests.2 12 McDonell therefore suggests that a government agency may test applicants for the presence of illicit drugs
without additional implication of fourth amendment protections.
With the exception of its sanction in the armed forces, 2 13 courts
have validated random or blanket urinalysis testing in only three
instances. In Shoemaker v. Handel, the court of appeals extended
the balancing test to its logical limits and held that a sufficiently
compelling government interest would preclude the requirement of
an objective standard of individualized suspicion to protect individual privacy interests. 21 4 The court ruled that privacy interests
could be protected from arbitrary interference by other safeguards. 21 5' The Eighth Circuit explicitly accepted that reasoning in
its modification of the district court's judgment in McDonell v.
Hunter 218 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit seems to have embraced
the holding in Shoemaker by its silence in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.217 Both courts apparently determined
that the procedural and administrative safeguards inherent in the
testing program would provide adequate protection to individual
privacy interests. 218 These decisions support a conclusion that a

210. McDonell, 612 F Supp. at 1130 n.6.
211. Miller, supra note 85, at 236-37.
212. Id. at 237.
213. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
214. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986). The author does not intend to imply that the court's analysis is unfounded, as the
Supreme Court has recognized that such an approach may be required by the circumstances
at issue. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55.
215. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142-43.
216. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) "[U]rinalysis may be performed uniformly or by systematic random selection.
Selection must not be arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at
1308.
217. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987). The
court never described its requirement of alternative safeguards in so many words. See id. at
176-80.
218. Id., McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308-09.
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government interest of sufficient magnitude will justify random
urinalysis testing.
The second prong of the Terry analysis, dealing with the scope
of intrusion, requires an examination of the procedures and personnel actions mandated in the order. Each agency must provide
sixty days' notice to its employees prior to implementation of any
program, and it must allow employees the opportunity to exercise
self-referral or submit medical documentation that would support
a legitimate use of specific drugs.2 19 In addition, the order requires
testing programs to include procedures for retention of records and
specimens, for retesting, and for the protection of the confidentiality of test results and related medical and rehabilitation records.220
Finally, collection procedures must allow individual privacy, unless
circumstances justify a belief that the individual might adulterate
or substitute the specimen. 2 '
The use of test results is limited to personnel actions. The order
declares that "[a]gencies are not required to report to the Attorney
General for investigation or prosecution . . . [information] received as a result of the operation of drug testing programs. "222
When an individual's test results are positive, agencies are authorized to take "appropriate personnel action," including referral to
the Employee Assistance Program for rehabilitation, to institute
disciplinary action, or to discharge the individual from employment.2 2 3 Disciplinary action is not mandatory when the employee
either voluntarily submits to testing (or identifies himself) or obtains counselling and rehabilitation subsequent to identification
and refrains from subsequent use. The order requires termination
when an employee refuses to seek counselling and rehabilitation or
fails to refrain from use after identification. 224 The federal plan
therefore effectively mandates discharge following a second finding
of illicit drug use.
The option of making a referral to rehabilitation and taking concurrent personnel action is modified by the requirement that em-

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Exec. Order
Id., 51 Fed.
Id.
Id., 51 Fed.
Id., 51 Fed.
Id.

No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889, 32,890-91 (1986).
Reg. at 32,891.
Reg. at 32,892.
Reg. at 32,891.
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ployees occupying sensitive positions be removed until completion
of rehabilitation.2 2 5 Agency heads are granted discretion to reinstate an employee as part of a rehabilitation program, subject to a
determination that the return "would not pose a danger to public
health or safety or the national security."2 2' 6
The order also authorizes evidentiary use of test results in any
adverse action against the employee, but prescribes confirmation of
the results by admission or a second analysis of the same specimen
prior to initiation of proceedings.2 27 In light of the decision in
Jones v. McKenzie,22 s if initial screening is done with the Syva
EMIT test, department programs should require confirmation by
an alternative testing process. Finally, agencies must also allow rebuttal of a positive test result by "other evidence that an employee
2' 29
has not used illegal drugs.
The order's procedural and administrative provisions delineate
the general structure envisioned for executive agency drug surveillance programs, and they appear to provide some safeguards for
the protection of employee privacy interests. By addressing the
concerns of notice and confidentiality while seeking to minimize
intrusion and afford procedural safeguards, the order incorporates
judicial mandates into an efficient, effective program to eradicate
drug abuse in the federal workplace.
CONCLUSION

Illicit drug use has a debilitating effect on a significant portion of
the nation's work force and causes immeasurable losses in productivity each year. In the federal work force, drug abuse poses an
unparalleled threat to public health and safety and to the integrity
of law enforcement and national security agencies.
Executive Order No. 12,564 embodies the recognition that
urinalysis testing, in combination with education and rehabilitation programs, is the most effective means to identify and combat
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
229. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. at 32,891. One alternative form of evidence is
the concurrent blood test, which is currently employed by the Federal Railroad Administration to confirm postaccident test results. See Miller, supra note 85, at 235.
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drug abuse in the federal work force. Because the order arguably
includes the most controversial element of drug testing-random
screening 2 3 0-and because it also contemplates the taking of specimens without a search warrant, a balancing test must be applied
under the analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio.2" ' Constitutional validation of the drug surveillance plan requires a qualitative assessment of government interests in comparison with the individual's reasonable privacy expectations. If the
government interests are of sufficient magnitude, intrusion may be
justified. The analysis in Terry also requires an examination of the
methods, the objectives, and the degree of intrusion to ensure that
the government's interference with individual privacy is reasonably
related to its purported goal.2 32
Any challenge to Executive Order No. 12,564 must initially suffer from a lack of ripeness. As the order merely authorizes federal
agencies to initiate and implement drug surveillance programs, it is
an inherently general description of the contemplated plan. The
Terry analysis requires a balancing of discrete factors, and therefore necessarily implicates a fact-specific analysis. Because the order is not sufficiently fact specific, any challenge to the federal
drug surveillance program must await implementation of a specific
agency directive.
By its terms, any order in compliance with Executive Order No.
12,564 will fulfill the first tier of the Terry analysis and a substantial degree of the second level. 3 The key to the validation of federal drug surveillance testing will then be the judiciary's reaction
to the intrusiveness of urinalysis testing and its qualitative assessment of the scope of the intrusion.
Mark E. Newcomb

230.
231.
232.
233.

See supra note 207.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.

